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Next Steps on North Korea
By Mel Gurtov
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The recent agreement by North Korea and the United States that exchanges US food aid for a North Korean moratorium on nuclear-weapon and missile tests and uranium enrichment would appear to be a major step forward on the denuclearization issue. But a careful examination of each side’s position and the internal politics at work suggest the need for considerable caution.
As the North Koreans see the issue—reflected in a Feb. 29 statement by the foreign ministry—the initial negotiations are a positive development. But they should be understood as merely the first step in a confidence-building process. Food-for-moratorium is not the end but the beginning of efforts to build a new relationship and achieve denuclearization. What happens next, said the statement, depends on “maintaining positive momentum” and continued “productive dialogue.” The North sees a sequence of steps taking place that should include the lifting of US sanctions, agreement on a peace treaty to end the Korean War, the provision of light-water nuclear reactors, and improvements in direct North Korea-US relations. Resumption of the Six-Party talks is accepted as being part of what they consider a dialogue process.
The US must not look to North Korea to do all the heavy lifting, the North Koreans are saying. And with good reason: US policy for many years has operated on the assumption that the “North Korean nuclear problem” is the only problem on the Korean peninsula, and that Pyongyang must come to accept US conditions on denuclearization before its security and economic development needs will be addressed. If that attitude persists, a good bet is that no further progress on denuclearization will be made.
Two other kinds of obstacles also may impede progress. The policy choices actually available to President Barack Obama and Kim Jong Un are inevitably constrained by the bureaucratic and other political interests that surround them. Obama will have great difficulty in this election year, or in any year, in crafting a new package deal with North Korea that will gain approval from Congress. He will face the same hawkish pressures that President Bill Clinton faced at the end of his presidency in 2000, when a major deal involving US aid in exchange for ending nuclear and missile development was nearly concluded. Kim Jong Un must also satisfy those around him—the military leaders. It is hardly accidental that within a few days of the announcement of a North Korea-US agreement, Kim visited the demilitarized zone and issued harsh threats against South Korea. Kim’s need to cultivate the military brass has been apparent from his first days as leader, and it would seem safe to predict that he will be under pressure not to give away North Korea’s nuclear bargaining chips merely for food supplements
The other obstacle is the South Korean government. Kim’s harsh words, echoed by the North Korean press, continue the verbal assault that the North has carried out ever since South Korean President Lee Myung-bak took office and reversed the engagement policies of his predecessors. What particularly rankles the North now are the military exercises that are taking place just as the North Korea-US talks have achieved initial progress. These include a live-fire drill by the South Korean army near the Yellow Sea boundary; a US-South Korea anti-submarine exercise; and the annual US-South Korea “Key Resolve” exercises. North Korea’s barrage of criticism no doubt seeks to drive a wedge between South Korea and the US; but it is an understandable reaction to the contradictory message being sent—negotiating on one hand while flexing military power on the other.
If there is any reason for optimism, it may lie in the spirit with which the two countries negotiated. The North Korean Foreign Ministry’s Feb. 29 statement said: “The US reaffirmed that it no longer has hostile intent toward the DPRK and that it is prepared to take steps to improve the bilateral relations in the spirit of mutual respect for sovereignty and equality.” For the North, the US statement of “no hostile intent” has great symbolic meaning: It reaffirms the wording of the joint communiqué issued on Oct. 12, 2000 when Vice Marshal Jo Myong Nok, Kim Jong Il’s special envoy and First Vice Chairman of the North Korean National Defense Commission, visited Washington; and it accepts the legitimacy of North Korea.
How both sides interpret “no hostile intent” is, of course, the crucial issue. For North Korea, will it mean moving toward verifiably stopping its nuclear-weapons and missile programs? For the US, will “no hostile intent” mean going beyond food aid to signing a peace treaty with North Korea, establishing formal diplomatic relations, and joining with South Korea, Japan, and China in a long-term economic development program for the North? Whether or not the North Korean and US leaderships can induce support for such a wide-ranging deal from their respective domestic constituencies is the central question from this point on.
Mel Gurtov is Professor Emeritus of Political Science in the Hatfield School of Government, Portland State University, Portland, Oregon.
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