As a special delegate to both the 2000 and 2007 summits between North and South Korea, the first such meetings ever held on the divided peninsula, I was fortunate to witness the changes in North-South relations over those seven years as reflected in the differences in ambiance, protocol, and agreements reached at the two summits.

Broadly speaking, the 2007 summit represented an important step toward turning the agreements of 2000 into reality. The earlier summit was largely symbolic, an introductory and tension-reducing event, while the 2007 summit produced far more practical agreements on economic cooperation and other areas that will advance future inter-Korean relations.

In carefully scripted diplomatic events, the smallest details often tell the bigger story. This is true of the two summits, including the finer points of the reception ceremony, the program line-up and the farewell luncheon.

The 2000 summit was a rather uncertain event because it was the first visit ever made to North Korea by a South Korean head of state. The official schedule was unknown, and there weren’t even educated guesses on who would be welcoming us at the airport. On June 13, 2000, when the South Korean delegation arrived at Sunan Airport in Pyongyang, the supreme leader, Chairman Kim Jong-il, was there to receive President Kim Dae-jung in person. We were surprised, because South Koreans expected Kim Young-nam, the president of the presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly and official head of state, to welcome President Kim. Although the welcoming ceremony was brief, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il rode in the same car to the Paekhwawon State Guest House, passing through downtown Pyongyang where over half a million North Koreans welcomed the motorcade with well-choreographed cheers.

In contrast, President Roh Moo-hyun’s visit to Pyongyang on Oct. 2, 2007 began with stage-managed drama. Instead of flying, Roh traveled by car to Pyongyang, the first time that a senior South Korean official had crossed into the North by land since the Korean War. On his way to Pyongyang, he got out of his car with the First Lady and walked across the Military Line of Demarcation that separates the two countries inside the demilitarized zone (DMZ), underscoring the artificial nature of the line.

The welcome in Pyongyang was quite impressive. Roh was greeted by head of state Kim Young-nam at the People’s Culture Palace and they paraded in an open car all the way to the April 25th Culture Center, where Kim Jong-il personally welcomed Roh amid enthusiastic cheers from several hundred thousand people.

To my knowledge, Roh is the first outsider to be formally welcomed in front of the April 25 Culture Center, which commemorates Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese resistance unit. Holding the reception at such a symbolic site in the heart of Pyongyang showed the North’s increasing acceptance of inter-Korean relations. Indeed, this was qualitatively different than the brief reception given to President Kim Dae-jung at Sunan Airport in 2000. Equally important was the fact that Kim Jong-il personally welcomed official and special delegates from the South in 2007, something that did not happen in 2000.

The overall schedule of the 2007 summit was similar to 2000. Roh and Kim Young-nam held a working meeting on the afternoon of Oct. 2, followed by a welcoming dinner hosted by Kim that evening. Roh reciprocated by hosting a dinner on Oct. 3 and Kim Jong-il hosted a farewell luncheon on Oct. 4. Nevertheless, there were some striking differences.

Whereas only one meeting was held between the two top leaders in 2000, two meetings took place in 2007, a morning and an afternoon session on Oct. 3. In 2000, Kim Jong-il attended the dinner hosted by President Kim, while in 2007 he did not attend the dinner hosted by Roh. Despite this, there seems to be a broad symmetry between 2000 and 2007 in terms of overall protocol, time allocation, and the encounters between the two leaders. Claims in the South Korean mass media that the 2007 summit was marred by negative protocol are unwarranted.

Another difference between the summits is seen in the seating arrangements of those North Korean leaders invited to the farewell luncheon hosted by Chairman Kim Jong-il at the Paekhwawon State Guest House on Oct. 4. In 2000, the North Koreans invited a number of symbolically important leaders to the luncheon who had no practical role in inter-Korean relations.

In contrast, the Kim Jong-il’s 2007 luncheon included North Korean participants who are directly involved in implementing the latest summit declaration. Most prominent among them were Prime Minister Kim Young-il and Deputy Prime Minister No Doo-chull. Since the 2007 summit declaration stipulated inter-Korean talks at the prime minister and deputy prime minister level, their presence is a positive sign. Kim Il-chol, North Korea’s Defense Minister, was also seated next to Kim Jang-soo, his counterpart in the South. North Korean generals Park Jae-kyung and Ri Myong-soo, both Vice Defense Ministers, were also present. Their attendance was interpreted as a sign of Kim Jong-il’s commitment to improved relations. It was also notable that Kang Seok-joo and Kim Gye-gwan, the North’s Vice Foreign Ministers in charge of the six-party talks, were seated at the head table. Given North Korea’s hierarchical leadership structure, this seating arrangement was extraordinary, and essentially represented a gesture of commitment on the part of Kim Jong-il toward the peaceful resolution of the nuclear problem. As in 2000, Kim’s brother-in-law Jang Sung-taik entertained business leaders, while Pak Nam-gi, the head of the Korea Worker’s Party’s planning and fiscal affairs department, entertained the presidents of South Korea’s leading state enterprises. Taken together, the functional composition of the North Korean participants at the 2007 summit and the nature of the seating arrangements suggest a genuine commitment to implementing the 2007 summit declaration.

Beyond the important signals contained in the protocol arrangements, there has also been remarkable progress in the substance of the meetings. This is evident when we compare the respective summit declarations – that of June 15, 2000 and that of Oct. 4, 2007. To be sure, the June 15 Declaration is of paramount importance precisely because without it, the Oct. 4 Declaration would not have been possible. However, the June 15 Declaration is largely symbolic and general, whereas the 2007 document is concrete and specific. What is most remarkable is that the two leaders reached agreement on 45 items across five broad areas in just two rounds of summit talks that lasted a combined four hours. During the 2000 summit, it took more than nine hours to reach agreement on six items, and President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il had to spend considerable time settling procedural issues such as who should sign the declaration and whether to include in the declaration a return visit by Chairman Kim to Seoul.

Compared with the June 15, 2000 declaration, which stipulated in very general terms the need for balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation, the 2007 declaration contained a broad range of concrete agreements. In particular, Article 5 of the declaration sets forth two principles of inter-Korean economic cooperation: “joint management for joint benefits and sharing abundance and needs with each other” and “preferential treatment in inter-Korean economic cooperation.”

From the creation of a special zone of peace and cooperation in the West Sea to symbolic cooperation to cheer for Korean athletes at next year’s Beijing Olympic games, the summit produced a framework for real cooperation. Against the backdrop of continued progress on the denuclearization of North Korea through the six-party talks process, I came away from the 2007 summit convinced that the meeting yielded substantial results.

Despite the overall success of the 2007 summit in institutionalizing inter-Korea relations, several daunting challenges lie ahead.

The first could arise from excessive optimism regarding the mutually beneficial relationship between the six-party talks and the inter-Korean summit, and between economic cooperation and peace. Although significant progress has been made, failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through the six-party talks could have a devastating impact on inter-Korean relations.

The second challenge involves deep-rooted suspicion and distrust between the two Koreas. Pyongyang still seems suspicious of Seoul’s intentions. The issue actually became somewhat pronounced when Roh proposed the creation of several special economic zones in the North for mutual cooperation. Kim’s response was quite negative. Commenting on the existing Kaeseong industrial zone, he said, “Thank you for your proposal, but we have not received any benefits from the Kaeseong project. The project was launched four years ago, but it is still in the pilot stage. You have not even arrived at the first stage. More importantly, the South has been staging a political propaganda campaign as if the Kaeseong project is a successful example of opening and reform in the North.”

In other words, Kim made it clear that he viewed Seoul’s proposal on special economic zones as an attempt to undermine the North Korean regime through “opening and reform.” Confronted with this response, Roh decided not to use terms such as “opening and reform” in the context of such zones – something that has triggered fierce opposition from conservative forces in the South. In order to further enhance inter-Korean cooperation, mutual suspicions regarding such economic zones will have to be overcome.

The third challenge emanates from inherent contradictions between inter-Korean cooperation and international cooperation. From the moment President Roh arrived in Pyongyang on Oct. 2, he was bombarded with North Korean sermonizing on the primacy of self-reliance and Korean national solidarity over international, especially US-South Korea, cooperation. However, Roh was firm. He argued that no country could live and prosper in complete self-reliance in a world of globalization and economic interdependence. Furthermore, he added that inter-Korean cooperation devoid of international cooperation, especially with the US, is virtually inconceivable and that there is no such a thing as absolute self-reliance. While Kim seemed to agree with the argument, this issue will nevertheless continue to haunt inter-Korean relations.

Finally, the specter of domestic confrontation over the South’s relationship to the North also clouds the future of inter-Korean relations. I do not see any reason why the next South Korean government would not honor the agreements in the 2007 declaration, provided that progress is made on nuclear issues. Even Lee Myung-bak, the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) presidential candidate and the current favorite to win the election, is likely to implement these agreements. The problem is whether the North is willing to cooperate. The GNP is the traditional party of hard-line anti-communism and Lee has been extremely critical of the North, describing the coming presidential election as “a fight between pro-North Korean leftists and pro-American conservatives.”

In the South, polarization between liberal proponents of engagement and conservative hardliners could undercut the prospects for improved inter-Korean relations. Overcoming the black-and-white mentality of South Korean politics is essential before a lasting and peaceful settlement with the North can be reached.

The 2007 Korean summit also reaffirmed the importance of the United States. It is generally believed that Kim proposed the summit because of the North’s desperate need for economic revitalization. But economic needs simply serve as a necessary condition. What prompted him to venture into a second summit is his perception of a genuine change in White House policy on the North. Kim seems to have high hopes that denuclearization can be exchanged for an end to hostile relations and eventual diplomatic normalization with the United States. Likewise, his perceptions of American policy and the overall nature of US-North Korea relations appear to be the most important factor in inter-Korean relations. In view of this, much still depends on American policy, which is why it demands our closest attention.

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For six years South Korean Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun sought a second inter-Korean summit meeting – without success. Why did North Korean leader Kim Jung-il agree to meet now? It is his way of acknowledging President George W. Bush’s commendable about-face on North Korea policy. He recognizes that Bush has put the United States firmly back on the road to reconciliation with North Korea. With the US now moving to end enmity, the North Korean leader is ready to extend and deepen engagement with the South, which is the best way to accelerate internal change in the North. Some observers are dismissing the upcoming summit, now scheduled for October 2-4 in Pyongyang, as a crude attempt to influence South Korea’s election, but they are missing the significance of this historic moment.

What can President Roh do to make the most of this historic moment? He can give new impetus to the process of reconciliation – and not only between the two Koreas.
He can probe whether Kim Jung-il intends to reenergize flagging efforts at economic reform, and if so, what he can do to help. He can also advance the process of ending the North’s nuclear arms programs – not directly by trying to negotiate with Kim Jung-il on the nuclear issue, but indirectly by sounding out the North Korean leader on his hopes for a peace regime on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea’s leaders have never agreed to a summit meeting with the South unless the US was improving relations with North Korea. When the US was taking steps to reconcile, they were ready to meet with South Korea’s president, but whenever Washington backtracked, they spurned summit meetings, letting North Korean propagandists blame the US and its “hostile policy” for the lack of progress in North-South relations.

This pattern began with Kim Il-sung’s drive, starting in 1988, to reconcile with all three of North Korea’s lifelong enemies – the US, South Korea, and Japan. The elder Kim, in a meeting with former US President Jimmy Carter just before his death, agreed to Carter’s suggestion of a summit meeting with South Korea’s president. To him, a visit by a former US president was testament to a shift in US policy away from enmity. With the US on the road to reconciliation, he was willing to meet with South Korea’s leader. He was also willing to commit himself to freezing and eventually eliminating his nuclear weapons program.

Neither effort reached fruition, in no small part because of South Korean and US actions. After Kim Il-sung’s death, South Korean President Kim Young-sam dashed hopes for a summit meeting by launching a campaign to disparage his successor in hopes of destabilizing the North Korean regime. And no sooner did Washington sign the Agreed Framework in October 1994 than Republicans won control of Congress and denounced the deal. Unwilling to take on Congress, US President Bill Clinton’s administration failed to keep its commitments under the accord, most significantly to “move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.” The North retaliated in 1998 by beginning to acquire the means to enrich uranium and testing a Nodong missile.

In late 1999, heeding the advice of President Kim Dae-jung, William Perry put Washington back on the road to reconciliation. Knowing that Seoul was seeking an inter-Korean summit meeting, Washington promised Pyongyang to end sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act once a summit took place. It also gave the North a draft communiqué saying neither government had “hostile intent” toward the other. This commitment to end enmity was issued when North Korean Vice Marshal Jo Myong-nok visited Washington the following July. With the US cooperating, Kim Jung-il was willing to host the first ever inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang and promised a return visit to the South. He also offered to end his medium- and longer-range missile programs.

Once again, hopes for a second summit and North Korean disarming did not come to fruition – this time because of President Clinton’s temporizing over Kim Jung-il’s invitation to come to Pyongyang and the Bush administration’s refusal even to talk to North Korea, let alone negotiate in earnest, and instead threatening regime change or worse. Pyongyang retaliated by ramping up its acquisition of equipment to enrich uranium. When Washington ignored its offer to negotiate the enrichment issue in October 2002 and instead suspended shipments of heavy fuel oil, the North in turn restarted its plutonium program.

Last September, confronted with the North’s 8-10 bombs’ worth of plutonium and a nuclear test impending, President Bush decided to negotiate for a change – taking steps to reconcile with North Korea in return for steps by Pyongyang to halt its nuclear programs. When the US Treasury Department finally lived up to the US commitment to resolve the Banco Delta Asia issue, a test of good faith in Pyongyang, North Korea implemented its promised suspension of its plutonium program. By doing what Clinton did, Bush legitimized diplomatic give-and-take as bipartisan US policy, making it easier for his successor to follow in his footsteps. As Kim Jung-il told China’s foreign minister on August 14, “Recently there have been signs that the situation on the Korean peninsula is easing.”

President Bush, who has repeatedly cited the second summit as a test of North Korea’s trustworthiness, now has confirmation that trust can be built – but only through mutual effort. And only a fundamental shift in political relations away from enmity – a gradual process that will take years – could reassure the North enough for it to yield its six-to-nine bombs’ worth of plutonium.

President Bush has held out the possibility of signing a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War, but only after North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons. Similarly, both President Bush and President Clinton have made full normalization of US relations with North Korea dependent on nuclear disarming. But peace agreements could be politically useful as interim steps to a peace treaty. Such agreements signed by the US, South Korea, and North Korea – the three countries with armed forces on the peninsula – could provide for confidence-building measures, like hotlines linking military commands, advanced notice of exercises, military exchanges, or an "open skies" arrangement allowing reconnaissance flights. One peace agreement that the North has long sought is replacement of the Military Armistice Commission set up to monitor the cease-fire at the end of the Korean War with a three-party "peace mechanism." That mechanism could be a venue for resolving disputes like the 1996 shooting down of a US reconnaissance helicopter that strayed across the DMZ or repeated incursions of North Korean spy submarines into southern waters, as well as for negotiating confidence-building measures (CBMs).

President Roh can use this opportunity to advance the six-party process by probing Kim’s ideas for a peace mechanism and other confidence-building measures. If Kim’s ideas prove negotiable, they could provide the basis for a series of peace agreements signed by the US and the two Koreas that could provide a form of diplomatic recognition the North desires. In return, that could elicit further steps by Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programs.

For South Koreans to make the most of this second summit meeting, they must begin by appreciating its real significance as an opportunity to advance reconciliation with North Korea, which is the only way to end its nuclear ambitions and bring about much-needed change in the North.

On Monday, October 8, North Korea apparently tested a nuclear device of indeterminate yield. The test threatens the entire security system and stability in East Asia, and undermines American interests acutely. Having delayed answering difficult questions about the impact of a nuclear North Korea for too long, countries in the region must now both deal with the immediate nuclear crisis and find ways to preserve the critical U.S. security alliances with Japan and South Korea. Instead of doing so at their leisure, however, states will now be forced to do so under pressure and under the watchful eye of North Korea and possible future proliferators such as Iran.

Information on the underground test is still emerging, but it is increasingly likely that North Korea has at long last crossed the nuclear threshold. Having pursued nuclear weapons for over a generation, perhaps it was inevitable that North Korea would eventually take this step. But it is far from clear if the test was a success or failure from a technical point of view. Without knowing what the test was designed to achieve, it is impossible to gauge its success or failure. Militarily, such insights matter a great deal, but politically they are less important. If the test produced a nuclear yield, then states must now acknowledge that North Korea is a nuclear state and decide how to respond. In the near-term, states in the region working with the U.S. must decide how they will respond directly to North Korea's actions.South Korea, the United States and Japan will work together to reinforce their military and political alliances and ensure mutual security in the years ahead will be the more crucial task.

There is a growing consensus that North Korea should be made to pay a severe penalty for having taken the provocative step of testing a nuclear weapon, and having rejected attempts to pursue diplomacy. This appears to be at least one conclusion that can be drawn from the UN Security Council's unanimous decision to impose sanctions. After this point, however, countries diverge. China, which is viewed by all as a critical player, has shown itself ready to respond to North Korea's behavior by agreeing to some ??prudent?? penalties. However, China??s strategic interest in preserving the stability of the North Korean state appears unchanged. As such, Beijing can be expected to avoid taking the most acute steps that might actually force Pyongyang to choose between possession of nuclear weapons and regime survival. Knowing this, Japan and the U.S. will have difficult choices to make in deciding what steps to pursue bilaterally or on their own, and what steps should be pursued only through a UN mandate. Japan??s decision to cut all North Korean shipping ties is an important step, but the full impact remains to be seen. Japan appears ready to go the furthest, along with the United States, in taking steps that can inflict actual punishment on the North Korean leadership, but even these combined efforts may fall short of motivating Kim Jong Il to change his nuclear behavior.

South Korea??s reaction is critical and it appears that the political fortunes of the current government will make strong action difficult without first gauging public support.Pyongyang and further highlight the differing threat perceptions of the U.S., South Korea and Japan. At the very least, it misses an historic opportunity for President Roh to show leadership and create a new political consensus towards North Korea in his own country.

Sadly, the reality of the situation is that the nuclear test does not radically change the strategic perceptions of states in the region. In fact, it appears to have solidified them, with Japan and U.S. convinced that isolation and pressure are the way to deal with North Korea, China upset by North Korea but unable or unwilling to destabilize the regime through meaningful actions, and South Korea split between a desire for engagement and the fear of a North Korean collapse or attack.

The result of these divisions is that North Korea will likely keep expanding its nuclear capability and eventually seek ways to exploit its new position. Being allowed to define the parameters of its own future actions, additional missile and nuclear tests in the months and years to come are likely. The critical issue now is for the U.S. to ensure that states in the region are confident that its commitment to defend them is unchanged and that Pyongyang understands any future mistake or miscalculation on their part could result in severe consequences, including even a nuclear strike by the United States.

Sadly, none of this was inevitable. As well intentioned as the motives of the Bush administration may have been to end the suffering of the North Korean people and bring about a more stable environment in East Asia by removing the North Korean regime, the results of their regime change policies have been a disaster in every way. Not only has North Korea become a nuclear state, but the standing of American credibility in the region and its ability to enforce nonproliferation norms it at risk. North Korea??s ever growing stock of weapons-usable plutonium could have remained extremely limited and under international inspection as was the case under the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Even had the agreement not been fully implemented, it would have kept North Korea with only a limited amount of nuclear material for weapons, and probably not enough to consider expending some on a nuclear test program.South Korea and even beyond.

All water under the bridge at this point, the moves taken by regional states, including North Korea, over the next few weeks will be critical to determining the long-term stability of the region. Putting a priority on alliance management and steps that deter provocative North Korean action should be of top concern. Once that is established, the parties will have the luxury to consider what, if anything, future diplomatic efforts might be able to achieve and to consider the costs and benefits of pursuing them with a nuclear North Korea. However, if history is any guide, Pyongyang will be even more difficult to manage after having crossed the nuclear finish line.